Optimization Analysis of Physical Protection Design for Small Offshore Reactors
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摘要: 较高的经济性是小型模块化反应堆（简称小型堆）的重要特征之一，按照当前核电站实物保护体系建设小型堆实物保护系统将对其经济性产生不利影响。本文以海上小型堆为分析对象，探索降低实物保护系统费用的优化方案，并对方案进行两轮优化及计算论证。通过分析，海上小型堆虽然取消了高成本的海面实体屏障及驻场武装响应力量，但通过增加舱室通道的延迟时间仍可保证系统的有效性。小型堆实物保护设计中，应根据堆型特点进行优化，在保证系统有效性的同时优先选择经济性更好的实物保护方案。Abstract: High economic efficiency is one of the important characteristics of small modular reactors (referred to as SMRs). Building a physical protection system for SMRs according to the current nuclear power plant physical protection system will have a negative impact on its economic efficiency. This article takes small offshore reactors as the analysis object, explores optimization schemes to reduce the cost of physical protection systems, and conducts two rounds of optimization and calculation demonstration for the schemes. Through analysis, although the physical barrier with high cost and on-site armed response forces have been eliminated for small offshore reactors, the effectiveness of the system can still be ensured by increasing the delay time of cabin passages. In the design of physical protection for SMRs, optimization should be carried out based on the characteristics of the reactor type, and a more cost-effective physical protection scheme should be selected while ensuring system effectiveness.
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Key words:
- SMR /
- Nuclear security /
- Physical protection
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图 2 海上小型堆实物保护方案示意图
Figure 2. Schematic Diagram of Physical Protection Scheme for Small Offshore Reactor
图 3 海上假想核设施的敌手入侵序列图
Figure 3. Adversary Invasion Sequence Diagram of Offshore Hypothetical Nuclear Facility
图 8 优化后海上假想核设施的敌手入侵序列图
Figure 8. Adversary Invasion Sequence Diagram of Offshore Hypothetical Nuclear Facility after Optimization
表 1 拦截概率表（优化前）
Table 1. Interception Brobability (before optimization)
路径 路径途径点 拦截概率/% 路径1 海上屏障→船舷→舱室通道→破坏活动 91.91 路径2 海上屏障→登船口→舱室通道→破坏活动 81.97 
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表 2 拦截概率表（第一次优化后）
Table 2. Interception Probability (after the first optimization)
路径 路径途径点 拦截概率/% 路径1 外部海域→监视区海域→警戒区海
域→船舷→舱室通道→破坏活动81.11 路径2 外部海域→监视区海域→警戒区海
域→登船口→舱室通道→破坏活动78.07
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表 3 拦截概率表（第二次优化后）
Table 3. Interception Probability (after the second optimization)
路径 路径途径点 拦截概率/% 路径1 外部海域→监视区海域→警戒区海
域→船舷→舱室通道→破坏活动91.52 路径2 外部海域→监视区海域→警戒区海
域→登船口→舱室通道→破坏活动90.37
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[1] LYMAN E. Small modular reactors: safety, security and cost concerns[EB/OL]. (2013-09-23)[2023-10-15]. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/small-modular-reactors. [2] GARCIA M L. Design and evaluation of physical protection systems[M]. 2nd ed. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008: 274-320. [3] ZHANG J W, JIANG S L, LIU J, et al. Optimization of communication probability in effectiveness evaluation of physical protection system[J]. IEEE Access, 2020, 8: 228199-228205. doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3046037 [4] GARCIA M L. Vulnerability assessment of physical protection systems[M]. England: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005: 267-273. -
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