Analysis of Mal-Operation Accidents of Nuclear Power Plant I&amp;C System

Cai Wei; Bao Guogang; Yue Zhidong; Lu Changdong

doi:10.13832/j.jnpe.2021.05.0167

Volume 42 Issue 5

Sep. 2021

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Cai Wei, Bao Guogang, Yue Zhidong, Lu Changdong. Analysis of Mal-Operation Accidents of Nuclear Power Plant I&C System[J]. Nuclear Power Engineering, 2021, 42(5): 167-172. doi: 10.13832/j.jnpe.2021.05.0167

Citation:

Cai Wei, Bao Guogang, Yue Zhidong, Lu Changdong. Analysis of Mal-Operation Accidents of Nuclear Power Plant I&C System[J]. Nuclear Power Engineering, 2021, 42(5): 167-172. doi: 10.13832/j.jnpe.2021.05.0167

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Analysis of Mal-Operation Accidents of Nuclear Power Plant I&C System

doi: 10.13832/j.jnpe.2021.05.0167

Shanghai Minhang Branch, China Nuclear Power Technology Research Institute Co., Ltd., Shanghai, 200241, China

Received Date: 2020-07-28
Rev Recd Date: 2020-09-02

Available Online: 2021-09-30

Publish Date: 2021-09-30

Abstract

Abstract

A method based on the simplified analysis was proposed in order to comprehensively evaluate the accidents of spurious actuation of Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Based on the concept of “functional group”, the Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs) of spurious I&C actuation were systematically identified and grouped to obtain the potential additional accidents that cannot be bounded by the existing accident analysis. Then these potential additional accidents were qualitatively assessed and quantitatively analyzed according to the conservative analysis assumptions and rules. The results show that the protection systems of the NPP can provide diverse protection against the spurious I&C accidents and the consequences meet the acceptance criteria. Besides, the function of “startup of safety injection and trip of the main pumps triggered by the low 2 signal of the difference between the local pressure and saturation pressure in two hot legs” was suggested to be added.
- Mal-operation of I&C system,
- Postulated initiating event (PIE),
- Accident analysis,
- Diverse protection

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References(14)

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