Discuss on Off-site Consequence Evaluation Criteria after Severe Accident for Zhangzhou NPP

Xing Ji; Shi Xueyao; Huang Shuming

doi:10.13832/j.jnpe.2022.06.0122

Volume 43 Issue 6

Dec. 2022

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Xing Ji, Shi Xueyao, Huang Shuming. Discuss on Off-site Consequence Evaluation Criteria after Severe Accident for Zhangzhou NPP[J]. Nuclear Power Engineering, 2022, 43(6): 122-127. doi: 10.13832/j.jnpe.2022.06.0122

Citation:

Xing Ji, Shi Xueyao, Huang Shuming. Discuss on Off-site Consequence Evaluation Criteria after Severe Accident for Zhangzhou NPP[J]. Nuclear Power Engineering, 2022, 43(6): 122-127. doi: 10.13832/j.jnpe.2022.06.0122

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Discuss on Off-site Consequence Evaluation Criteria after Severe Accident for Zhangzhou NPP

doi: 10.13832/j.jnpe.2022.06.0122

China Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd., Beijing, 100840, China

Received Date: 2021-12-29
Rev Recd Date: 2022-09-26
Publish Date: 2022-12-14

Abstract

Abstract

In order to quantitatively evaluate the basic objective of “offsite protective actions that can reduce the radiological consequences technically are limited or even can be cancelled”, this paper proposes the design objective of “no evacuation is required beyond 3 km, no concealment and iodine taking are required beyond 5 km” after severe accidents from the perspective of simplifying off-site emergency after accidents. Combined with the site conditions of Zhangzhou NPP, a set of radioactive consequence evaluation criteria for Zhangzhou NPP are derived. Through the analysis of the typical severe accident process and radioactive release process of HPR1000, the results show that the HPR1000 reactor type of Zhangzhou NPP meets the radiological consequence evaluation criteria proposed in this paper, and can achieve the goal of “no evacuation is required beyond 3 km, no concealment and iodine taking are required beyond 5 km” after a severe accident.
- HPR1000,
- Severe accident,
- Radioactive source term,
- Emergency simplification

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References(13)

References

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